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Preliminary remarks and abstract 
The recent financial crisis has accelerated the changes with regard to the spatial 
organization of financial channels. In direct investments, the venture capital industry in 
Switzerland used to be connected to national and international financial markets. Today 
these traditional direct investment players decline because their traditional business model 
is no longer suited for the current economic context. Instead, a new business model for 
direct investment has recently emerged while revitalizing this financial sector: 
crowdinvesting platforms exploit more intensively the possibilities opened by ICTs and of 
specialized, but dispersed, expertise. The paper highlights the strengths and weaknesses of 
both business models as well as their contrasted time and space ways to deal with 
uncertainty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The causes of the global financial crisis which erupted in 2008 have been widely analysed and 
debated over the past five years. The growth of market finance and the financialisation of 
economic activities have stimulated the accumulation of financial capital, thereby creating a rift 
between finance and real economic activities (Boyer, 2011). In Switzerland, institutional investors 
such as pension funds have gradually moved from the internal management of portfolios 
composed mainly of domestic property and bonds to asset management delegated to financial 
intermediaries with portfolios of liquid financial assets on a global scale (Corpataux et al., 2009; 
Theurillat et al., 2006 b). This preference for liquid investments through the financial markets can 
be explained in part by a radical shift in the assessment of the risk borne by the investor. In the 
current financial system, the concept of the risk has been almost completely removed in the eyes 
of investors. Thanks to the diversified portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1959) and to sophisticated 
financial analyses based on probability, financial risk has been perceived as probabilisable, 
transferable and manageable.  
However, the stock market crash of 2008 was followed by a crisis of confidence in this system, and 
by a loss of legitimacy for the major financial institutions. In 2008, Swiss pension funds, which had 
placed a substantial proportion of their capital in equities and bonds, made a net loss of CHF 76.2 
billion (13% of capital) on their equity investments (OFS, 2010). Thus the financial crisis revealed 
the gap in risk assessment between concrete and direct investments and complex financial 
products (the well-known subprime asset-backed securities), which were supposed to reduce the 
global risk of an investment portfolio. 
The present article starts from the assumption that this financial crisis is structural in nature. The 
investment channels established from the 1980s onwards, focusing on the financial markets, are 
no longer able either to fulfil their role in financing the real economy or to meet the expectations of 
investors. 
Here we shall approach this issue through the question of financing innovative start-ups and 
expanding SMEs in Switzerland. In the financialised system of the past twenty years, this role has 
been fulfilled by venture capital (VC) or private equity (PE) funds. VC and PE funds raise capital 
from institutional investors (for instance, pension funds) and invest it directly in enterprises. A world 
leader in terms of innovation and competitiveness, Switzerland offers favourable framework 
conditions for the development of the ecosystem for technological and innovative start-ups. Against 
this background, venture capital companies could play a key role as intermediaries responsible for 
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the capital of institutional investors that might be more inclined to prioritise this type of investment 
as an alternative to investments through the financial markets.  
So do institutional investors invest directly in start-ups and SMEs more? Our research has shown 
that this is not the case. In the wake of the heavy losses suffered after 2008, institutional investors 
have become extremely cautious and are reluctant to entrust their capital to VC and PE funds. 
Furthermore, they lack the necessary industrial skills and hence continue to invest in the financial 
markets on the basis of the portfolio theory. 
Further, it has been observed that the venture capital industry in Switzerland is currently in a phase 
of decline. The results of our research suggest that the obstacles encountered by investment 
players in start-ups are structural in nature. Faced upstream with growing uncertainties as to their 
ability to raise new funds from institutional investors, venture capital companies are also 
experiencing great difficulties in identifying ‘sound’ start-up projects to build a successful portfolio. 
With no room for failure lest they lose the confidence of investors, Swiss venture capital funds are 
abandoning the early stage start-up market in order to concentrate more on the very competitive 
market of expanding companies that already have proof of product and proof of market. In this 
article we suggest that the traditional venture capital model may be regarded as outdated and too 
restrictive in relation to today’s growing number of start-ups. Taking this as our starting point, we 
ask where and how these start-ups can find finance. 
The past two years have seen the emergence of crowdinvesting platforms, which today represent 
new ways of financing innovative projects. Based on a case-study of a crowdinvesting platform in 
Switzerland, the new multi-sided investment platform business model is contrasted with the 
traditional venture capital business model. We will show that investment channels are evolving fast 
at the initiative of private rather than institutional investors, both in terms of risk management 
methods and the types of players and their rationale, and from the point of view of the spatial and 
temporal organisation of the investment process.  
The paper is structured as follows. After explaining our methodology (Section 1), we examine the 
evidence of the venture capital slowdown in Switzerland (Section 2). This article then introduces 
the concept of intermediary platforms (Section 3) and contrasts the temporal, spatial and 
procedural dimensions of a crowdinvesting platform with the traditional VC business model 
(Section 4). In the Section 5, we present our findings regarding the reasons for the decline of 
venture capital in Switzerland. Finally, we discuss key features of the hybrid investment model of 
the Investiere crowdinvesting platform, showing how this still-emerging model is based on a 
radically new approach (Section 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
Despite the rapidly-expanding research on many aspects of intermediary platforms, there is still 
much scope for studies in this field (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2014). In addition, far too little 
attention has been paid to the reasons for the decline in venture capital since 2008, notably from 
the institutional and geographical perspective. The aim of this study is therefore to understand the 
slowdown of the venture capital industry in the Swiss context and to explore to what extent the 
recently created crowdinvesting platforms represent a new “updated” form of venture capital for 
early-stage start-up financing. The current research is based on a case study of traditional venture 
capital industry and new crowdinvesting platform in Switzerland.  
Our main research questions can be formulated as follows:  
• What factors explain the decline in venture capital in Switzerland despite the growing 
number of start-ups and the favourable framework conditions?  
• To what extent do the new forms of financing innovative start-ups via crowdinvesting 
platforms bring into question the traditional venture capital model?  
To answer these research questions, we have conducted a case study at two levels:  
First, we conducted twelve qualitative interviews with various stakeholders from the Swiss pension 
fund sector: five pension fund managers, five investment advisers and two financial institutions 
managers. We believe that Swiss pension funds are good example, along with other institutional 
investors such as insurance companies and banks, because these investors have acquired a very 
powerful position in financial sphere and, with total assets of CHF 671 billion in 2012 0F1, have the 
real ability to affect financial and real economic activities.  
1 2012 pension fund results , Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
(http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/13/02/03.html) 
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The questions that guided our interviews related to the choice of investment strategies, particularly 
in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. The main aim was thus to understand why funds have 
not changed their approach to allocating capital in the wake of the financial crisis, and the reasons 
why they seem uninterested in diversifying their portfolios with venture capital by investing more 
directly in the economy, especially at regional or national level.  
Second, in order to understand why the traditional venture capital business model has failed, we 
conducted eight interviews with a range of players active in the market for direct investment in 
early-stage start-ups: management team members of three venture capital funds, two business 
angels clubs, and three founders of intermediary crowdinvesting platforms. Finally, we carried out a 
case study of the largest crowdinvesting platform in Switzerland, in order to compare its business 
model with the traditional venture capital model. 
The questions addressed during the individual interviews aimed to highlight the shared and 
distinctive elements of traditional VC and crowdinvesting platform business models. By focusing on 
strategies for fund raising, deal sourcing and deal evaluation, we have tried to understand how far 
the new business model offered by crowdinvesting platforms would make it possible to manage 
better the problem of uncertainty during the selection and evaluation of innovative early-stage 
projects.  
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2. VENTURE CAPITAL DECLINE IN SWITZERLAND: INVESTOR 
MISTRUST AND BUSINESS MODEL WEAKNESS 
 
Over the previous decade and, in particular, since the financial crisis of 2008, global venture capital 
activities have underperformed and have been shrinking both in terms of the amounts raised and 
the number of investment rounds1F2 (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2014; Harris et al., 2012). According 
to the recent study by Ernst&Young (2013), the global venture capital market suffers from 
unfavourable exit conditions reflected in a drop in the number of VC-backed IPOs2F3 and M&A3F4. This 
trend affects all markets across all regions. In Europe, VC funds have shown less risk appetite by 
realigning their investment choices on later-stage companies and those already generating 
revenue (Ernst&Young, 2013). Furthermore, because of the poor performance of many VC funds 
during the six last years, they struggle to raise new funds, as institutional investors, disappointed 
by low returns, show a preference for the most successful large funds with a perfect track record. 
This slowdown particularly affects traditional venture capital investments, while, at the same time, 
the share of corporate venture capital has significantly increased, exceeding 15% of all venture 
capital investments by the end of 20124F5 (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2014; Ernst&Young, 2013). 
In Switzerland, the venture capital market has also entered into a phase of decline and is losing 
ground in the financing of innovation. In fact, Swiss VC companies are suffering from a lack of 
investment capital and struggle to raise new funds. According to the Swiss Commission for 
Technology and Innovation (CTI, 2011)5F6, the amount of venture capital invested in Switzerland has 
shown a disturbing decline of about 40% during the last five years. Thus, venture capital 
investments in early stage start-ups fell by more than 50% from €161 billion in 2011 to €73 billion in 
2 Since 2006, global venture capital investments have declined by 20% and the number of VC investment rounds has 
fallen by 8% (Ernst & Young, 2013, Turning the corner. Global venture capital insights and trends 2013). 
3 An initial public offering, or IPO, is the first sale of a corporation's common shares to investors on a public stock 
exchange. The main purpose of an IPO is to raise capital for the corporation. While IPOs are effective at raising capital, 
being listed on a stock exchange comes with heavy regulatory compliance and reporting requirements 
(www.wikinvest.com). 
4 Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) is a general term used to refer to the consolidation of companies. A merger is a 
combination of two companies to form a new company, while an acquisition is the purchase of one company by 
another in which no new company is formed (www.investopedia.com). 
5 15.2% of deals with corporate VC involvement (according to National Venture Capital Association statistics): 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=99&Itemid=317  
6 http://www.kti.admin.ch/dokumentation/00077/?lang=en 
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2012 (Fig 1). In contrast, “later stage” participations grew by more than 50% in 2012 reaching €77 
billion compared with €34 billion in 2011 (SECA, 2013). While the number of early stage 
transactions is falling, investment periods are tending to become longer (7 years instead of 4-5) 
and the capital gain smaller. This situation may seem paradoxical, since Switzerland has a surplus 
of capital compared with a small number of venture capital companies (SECO, 2012). 
 
Figure 1. Venture Capital Investment Stage focus 
 
Source: SECA Yearbook 2013 (SECA, 2013) 
Furthermore, according to some public and private economic circles in Switzerland, the Swiss 
market for direct investment in early-stage start-ups shows great potential (SECA, 2013; SECO, 
2012). In the same vein, the recent report of the “Avenir Suisse” think tank 6F7, which is concerned 
with the financing of innovation, argues that the growing number of Swiss start-ups (Fig. 2) 
suggests that current framework conditions are very favourable to start-up creation (Comtesse and 
Zinkl, 2013). According to these players, Switzerland, as a world leader in innovation and 
competitiveness, provides a highly supportive environment for high-tech innovative start-up 
creation (Comtesse and Zinkl, 2013). 
  
7 Avenir Suisse – Think Tank for Economic and Social issues, http://www.avenir-suisse.ch/en/about-us/ 
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Figure 2. Swiss Start-ups Creation 2002-2012 
 
 
 
Source: www.startup.ch 
At the same time, the number of private investors wishing to invest directly in innovative unlisted 
start-ups has risen sharply in recent years (SECO, 2012). These new private investors are fairly 
heterogeneous in terms of experiences, profit expectations and investment approaches.  
 
 2.1 Funding gap and VC spatial dynamics 
Despite these two positive developments - the sufficient number of high quality innovative start-ups 
and the significant increase in private investor demand - a funding gap has nevertheless been 
created at the bottom end of the venture capital market, in financing seed and early stage projects. 
In the literature studying entrepreneurial finance, the lower rate of VC activity in some countries 
than in others is usually explained in terms of the absence of an exit market, insufficiently 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, unfavourable legal and corporate governance conditions, and political 
and economic country-related risk and cultural differences (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). Economic 
geographers have put a spatial dynamics approach at the centre of their research into VC 
activities. For instance, Martin et al. (2002) argue that such a “gap of risk capital” may be viewed 
as a consequence of some particular geographies of venture capitalism. Spatial inequalities within 
venture capital allocations, between regions and countries, may thus be explained by the 
observation that despite some national differences, venture capital firms are disproportionally 
located in more dynamic and buoyant regions to the detriment of less prosperous areas (Martin et 
al., 2002). Further, they tend to be concentrated in identifiable clusters of high-technology firms 
and close to clusters of other venture capital firms.  
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In the case of Switzerland, spatial and market-related arguments do not seem to be enough to 
explain the VC slowdown. In addition to a politically and economically secure environment, Swiss 
VC firms can also benefit from geographical proximity to a high quality start-up ecosystem on the 
one hand, and major financial institutions and syndicate partners on the other. Instead, the existing 
funding gap could be due to the start-up development stage and the nature of the product 
innovation (SECA, 2013; SECO, 2012). Venture capital firms have been reluctant to finance 
companies requiring smaller amounts of capital, especially those at the early stage of business 
development. As argued by Mason and Harrison (1991), such investments require as much, if not 
more, time to investigate and monitor than larger proposals and have a longer payback period of at 
least 5-7 years with a higher risk. Business angels, or informal venture capitalists (Bonnet, 2012), 
who traditionally operate at this stage, are too few in Switzerland7F8 to cover the increased early 
stage financing needs. In fact, such an equity gap probably occurs when venture capital deals tend 
to be too large, and business angel finance is underdeveloped (Mason and Harrison, 1991). 
 
 2.2 What kind of innovation can fill the funding gap within Swiss  
start-ups? 
 In neo-Schumpeterian innovation theory, product innovation can be of two kinds: radical or 
incremental (Cooke et al., 2011). In Malerba (1992), incremental innovation is generated from 
firms’ accumulated stock of knowledge and consists mostly of minor modifications and 
improvements to already existing products. This type of “marginal” innovation contrasts with 
“radical” or “disruptive” innovation which entails the introduction of a totally new type of technology 
or “technological revolution” (Fagerberg, 2005). Following the assumptions of Schumpeter (1934), 
scholars have emphasized the essential interplay between radical and incremental innovation over 
the course of the product cycle (Tushman and Nelson, 1990). Cooke et al. (2011) pointed to the 
inadequacy of a restrictive binary distinction between these two types of innovation. These 
scholars argued that long-wave radical innovation is continuously interspersed with epochal 
passages of incremental innovation or “normal science” (Cooke et al., 2011). 
8 Interviews with several Business Angels and venture capital actors in Switzerland 
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Yet in the VC industry, breakthrough or “disruptive” innovation seems to be more attractive to 
capital inflows, especially those of big multinational companies (corporate venture capital) (Rice et 
al., 2000; Weber and Weber, 2007). In fact, as shown by Hellmann and Puri (2000), innovators, or 
firms that are first to introduce new products or services to the market, obtain venture capital earlier 
in the life cycle than do imitators which are also engaged in relatively new products and 
technologies, but are not the first movers in their markets. According to a recent Avenir Suisse 
report 8F9, the great majority of Swiss start-ups involve incremental rather than disruptive types of 
innovation (Comtesse and Zinkl, 2013). The report’s authors explain the VC industry slowdown in 
Switzerland mostly by the lack of “disruptive” innovation, except, of course, in the field of life 
sciences (i.e. the pharmaceutical industry). Interestingly, the biggest Swiss VC funds operate 
mainly in this area.  
In the light of this, we argue in this paper that the problems of VC financing in Switzerland might be 
because the traditional VC business model has become outdated and inadequate for bringing 
together institutional investment and early stage start-ups. In contrast, today we can observe the 
emergence of new forms of intermediation between investment capital (mostly private) and 
innovative start-ups. In this paper, we suggest exploring this phenomenon by using the concept of 
crowdinvesting platforms which has developed in the last two or three years. These new 
platforms play the role of intermediaries by bringing together the different stakeholders: private and 
professional investors, start-up creators, industry experts, etc.  
 
3. INTERMEDIARY PLATFORM CONCEPT 
Our understanding of the intermediary platform concept builds on the growing research into 
platform economics and multi-sided markets (Evans, 2011, 2013; Simon, 2013). In today’s 
economic environment, characterized by an explosive development of information and 
communication technologies, the platform model "is becoming one of the most important business 
models of the new millennium" (Simon, 2013: 23), in contrast to traditional models of organization.  
  
9 Avenir Suisse – Think Tank for Economic and Social issues, http://www.avenir-suisse.ch/en/about-us/ 
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So, wherein exactly does the “novelty” of this business model lie? Simon (2013) clarifies some of 
the key features that distinguish today’s platforms from previous forms of business organization. 
Thus, new platform players are both business and consumer-oriented. Unlike traditional 
organizations which are fairly stable and based on a limited number of strategic partners, new 
platforms are dynamic, evolving and changing. They are also based on partnerships and 
communities which rapidly form, change and dissolve (Simon, 2013). Platforms are cooperation-
based, mostly open source, bottom-up and less proprietary than traditional organizations (Simon, 
2013). 
Platforms play a central role in providing intermediation services (Bessy and Chauvin, 2013). By 
assessing and certifying products, people and organizations,  intermediaries (private and public) 
contribute to building the trust which is essential to the achievement of the mercantile exchange 
(Vatin, 2013). Because of their role as matchmakers between different kinds of players, platforms 
represent “multi-faced” or “multi-sided” devices (Evans, 2013). As defined by Evans (2011) : “a 
two-sided platform provides goods or services to two distinct groups of customers who need each 
other in some way and who rely on the platform to intermediate transactions between them” 
(p.137). In addition, due to their “combinatory” capabilities (Cooke, 2010), their multi-activities and 
multi-functionalities, intermediary platforms help individual economic stakeholders to better 
manage the complexity of today’s world of innovation and technologies. These platforms can also 
facilitate combinatory learning methods by building complex relationships around knowledge, 
interconnecting people, solving problems and providing new business opportunities (Crevoisier and 
Jeannerat, 2009). They facilitate the management and sharing of knowledge between multiple 
players involved in different “communities of practice” (Wenger et al., 2002). This combinatory 
learning model has been at the heart of the rapid development of crowdsourcing or open 
innovation platforms since the early 2000s (Liotard, 2012). The value created on these platforms 
derives mainly from a variety of devices and services which facilitate access to information and 
manage relationships among multiple players from different economic sectors (Liotard, 2012). 
Finally, by targeting the greater transparency of information, the platform also seeks to reduce 
uncertainty and to strengthen confidence between its users, for instance between private investors 
and entrepreneurs brought together on crowdfunding platforms (Belleflamme et al., 2012). 
However, to ensure its credibility and legitimacy as an intermediary, a platform should reach a 
certain critical mass (Evans, 2013). This implies that each “face” of the platform must have 
sufficient users to be able to create enough value to attract new members (Evans 2013). If a 
platform fails to reach this critical mass, its members would tend to reduce their participation due to 
lack of recognition (Evans, 2013). Hence network effects are crucial in understanding the power of 
the platform: “Platforms become exponentially more popular as they become more popular” 
(Simon, 2013: 26).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
This observation inspired us to look more closely at possible explanations of VC slowdown in the 
Swiss economic context. It also raised the question of the extent to which the emerging forms of 
financing for innovation (i.e. crowdinvesting platforms) could represent alternative solutions in 
terms of dealing with uncertainty when investing directly in early stage start-ups.  
Hitherto, the large body of literature on venture capital and entrepreneurial finance has 
demonstrated researchers’ interest in analysing venture capital fund performance, valuation 
methods and decision-making criteria (Festel et al., 2013; Harris et al., 2012; Kollmann et al., 2011; 
Teten and Farmer, 2010; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2007). However, too little research has 
attempted to compare the traditional venture capital business model (formal and informal) with new 
unconventional forms of start-up financing, namely crowdinvesting intermediary platforms. In the 
next section we shall compare the decision-making logic and investment process adopted by 
venture capital firms and crowdinvesting platforms. The conceptual comparison below is based on 
a wide range of information sources: existing academic literature, public and private meetings and 
conferences, web-based content analysis, observation of crowdinvesting platform web sites and 
face-to-face discussions with several platform clients and founders.  
 
4. CROWDINVESTING PLATFORMS VERSUS TRADITIONAL 
VENTURE CAPITAL  
The growing academic research exploring crowdinvesting platforms as an alternative early-stage 
start-up financing model is still embryonic. In most papers we have reviewed, crowdinvesting is 
defined as a new, more start-up oriented form of crowdfunding (Hagedorn and Pinkwart, 2013; 
Harrison, 2013; Klöhn and Hornuf, 2012; Moritz and Block, 2013).  
The phenomenon of crowdfunding appeared a few years ago and saw rapid growth through the 
Internet, first in the United States and then in Europe, as an alternative way to finance projects that 
experience difficulty in accessing funding capital through traditional finance channels (Harrison, 
2013). In the growing literature, the concept of crowdfunding is commonly defined as a way of 
“raising money from general public, or the “crowd”, via an intermediary platform that is typically 
web-based” (Tomczak and Brem, 2013: 285). Several scholars have argued that crowdfunding has 
evolved from the broader concept of crowdsourcing, meaning the outsourcing of a particular 
problem to the crowd of anonymous individuals by drawing on their knowledge and expertise 
(Belleflamme et al., 2011; Hagedorn and Pinkwart, 2013). More precisely, the phenomenon of 
crowdfunding embodies the combination of two concepts: crowdsourcing and microfinance 
(Harrison, 2013). The latter refers to both financial and social intermediation by means of small 
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loans for economically active but poor borrowers unable to access more conventional sources of 
financing (Ledgerwood, 1998).  
In the recent literature, the funding model put into practice by crowdinvesting platforms is often 
related to the venture capital investment approach. Hagedorn and Pinkwart (2013) consider the 
“equity model” of crowdfunding as the second generation of venture capital which takes advantage 
of the power of the crowd: "Crowdinvesting is a financing method for young ventures and other 
commercial projects that supports the acquisition of equity by coordinating the submission of 
different forms of shares to an undefined group of possible investors through social virtual 
communities" (Hagedorn and Pinkwart, 2013: 17). As pointed out by Harrison (2013), 
crowdinvesting or the “equity model” of crowdfunding represents the most recent of the distinct 
crowdfunding models (the others being donation, reward, pre-purchase and lending models). The 
crowdinvesting model offers investors equity-based rewards, which means a stake or a share of 
the profit stream, a financial product or an interest in a managed investment scheme (Harrison, 
2013). Crowdinvestors are therefore rewarded by the return on the investment, as in traditional 
venture capital investment (Hagedorn and Pinkwart, 2013). Since 2007, crowdinvesting or equity-
based crowdfunding has undergone massive growth, with an increase of 114% in Europe9F10, mainly 
due to the proliferation of European platforms (Tomczak and Brem, 2013). 
 
 4.1 Investment and decision making process  
In many research papers discussing the issue of new crowd financing practices, crowdinvesting is 
usually contrasted with traditional venture capital investment approaches (Hagedorn and Pinkwart, 
2013; Kortleben and Vollmar, 2012). These two forms of investing in young ventures are compared 
mainly from the perspective of investment process (stages) and start-up selection/assessment 
strategies (Hagedorn and Pinkwart, 2013; Kortleben and Vollmar, 2012). As a general rule, venture 
capital firms conduct their investments in five stages (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984) : (1) deal 
generation, (2) screening, (3) evaluation, (4) structuring and (5) post investment activities. In the 
case of crowdinvesting platforms, the investment process lasts longer, because of a two-step start-
up selection/assessment process: first, by platform founders and, then, by a large community of 
crowd investors (Hagedorn and Pinkwart, 2013; Kortleben and Vollmar, 2012).  
10 "Crowdfunding Industry Report: Market Trends, Composition and Crowdfunding Platforms", 2012,  (Los 
Angeles, California: Crowdsourcing LLC) pp 1-30 
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During the selection/assessment phase, venture capital firms undertake a thorough due diligence 
process, based on various decision-making criteria (entrepreneur, technology, product and market-
related) (Festel et al., 2013). The due diligence is then completed by a standard financial ratio 
analysis (Metrick and Yasuda, 2011). Conversely, the due diligence carried out by the platform's 
managers is lighter and simplified. Indeed, every individual investor is required to perform its own 
assessment on the basis of the entrepreneur's business plan and oral presentation of the start-up 
project. The crowd investor thus takes sole responsibility for the final decision to invest. However, 
through communication tools available on these web-based platforms (e.g. discussion forums), 
potential investors have an opportunity to verify and contrast their estimates by interacting with 
other investors and the start-up founder. As investing through crowdinvesting platforms is 
accessible to anyone willing to invest their own money, Hagedorn and Pinkwart (2013) emphasize 
that it can be assumed that all private investors do not possess the knowledge to evaluate any 
business proposal. This necessarily raises the question of trust-building. In the event that investors 
have insufficient specialist knowledge (uninformed investors), individuals need to rely on the word 
of the start-up founder and/or follow some other, better-informed crowdinvestors whose expertise 
is recognized (Hagedorn and Pinkwart, 2013). Trust-building therefore becomes a strong factor in 
the decision to invest. 
Table 1. Traditional Venture Capital Vs. Crowdinvesting platforms 
 
 
Source: Hagedorn and Pinkwart (2013), Metrick and Yasuda (2011) 
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 4.2 Time and space issues 
It is worth noting that apart from the divergences in start-up selection/assessment approaches, the 
comparison between venture capital firms and crowdinvesting platforms raises the question of 
temporal issues quite differently (Tab. 1). 
Venture capital firms, which invest in start-ups on behalf of institutional investors, begin their 
investment process with fundraising (Fig. 3). This first step is crucial and represents one of the 
major sources of uncertainty in this field (Branche and al., 2012). Currently, the fundraising stage is 
severely undermined by the high risk aversion of institutional investors, especially with regard to 
direct investment in unlisted start-ups and SMEs10F11 (2.1.). Hence, every three or four years, each 
new venture capital fund creation would be determined by the ability of the VC team to convince 
investors to entrust them with their money. Furthermore, the outcome of every fundraising exercise 
might be heavily influenced by a successful history of previous exits, and not only by the power of 
persuasion. This being so, a venture capital fund must assume, as financial intermediary, the full 
risk and responsibility for its investment choices. It cannot afford to fail because that would hamper 
the setting up of the next fund, and hence the future of the VC firm. That is why the next step in 
investment decision-making is often seen as a second major source of uncertainty for VC fund 
managers (Branche and al., 2012).  VC firms therefore tend to increase their sectoral specialization 
with a narrow focus on just one sector or just one market in which they can best control distribution 
and exit networks, while giving preference to later-stage start-ups with proof of product and 
market11F12. Finally, the whole investment process is characterized by an accelerating race for exit, 
between two and four years, instead of four to five years in the early 2000s (Mason and Harrison, 
2002).  
The second phase of the investment process (deal sourcing) entails another important challenge 
for VC funds, that of selecting the least risky and highest-potential start-ups from the huge volume 
of proposals they receive. By contrast, the first step on crowdinvesting platforms consists of pre-
selecting several promising start-ups from those that are already registered on the platform. In its 
role of intermediary, the platform founders bear a minimal financial risk. Unlike the venture capital 
11 Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
12 Interview with a manager of a Swiss VC fund (SVC-Venture Capital, Crédit Suisse) 
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funds’ remuneration system based on capital gain after exit (20%) in addition to 2% 12F13 of 
management fees (Bonnet, 2012; Metrick and Yasuda, 2011), the income generated by 
crowdinvesting platforms comes mainly from levies on the finance raised13F14 as well as from various 
services intended for project owners (start-up presentation video, coaching, etc.) and for investors 
(learning seminars, split investment, etc.). Thus, multi-sided platforms (Evans, 2011) are primarily 
responsible for ensuring a better match between the expectations of start-up founders and those of 
potential private investors.  
Figure 3. Temporal logics of Venture capital vs. Crowdinvesting investment process 
 
 
 
Source : Own elaboration 
Like the temporal organisation of the investment process, the spatial dimensions of stakeholders 
and financial channels generated by traditional venture capital players and crowdinvesting 
platforms also take shape differently (Fig. 4).  
As argued by Christensen (2011), the concentration of venture capital firms in major financial 
centres, where economic activity is high, is often a demand-induced pattern. Hence dynamic urban 
areas attract the largest share of VC investments because of their close relations with financial and 
other institutions that may assist investment decisions and post-investment monitoring: technology 
13 It is 2% of invested capital (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011) 
14 According to the study conducted by Hagedorn A, Pinkwart A, 2013, "Crowdinvesting as a Financing 
Instrument for Startups in Germany. A Critical Platform Analysis." HHL Working Paper N°120, 
crowdinvesting platforms levy from 5% to 10% of the sum raised in the event of a successful financing round. 
These results are based on a survey of 13 crowdinvesting platforms in Germany. 
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experts, a wide range of business services, head-hunters and access to syndicate partners 
(Christensen, 2011). In fact, geographical proximity matters for VC investments, both for venture 
capital firms themselves and start-ups. While facilitating access to the “tacit” knowledge which is 
needed to assess the trustworthiness of management, it makes it possible to reduce transaction 
costs which are higher if the financier is not close to the small firm (Christensen, 2011). This 
knowledge and expertise are essential for raising new funds within institutional partners, finding 
“good” deals, organizing investments and monitoring portfolio companies. At the same time, 
venture capital funds tend to invest locally, that is to say, close to VC clusters, such as big financial 
centres (Mason, 2007). This spatial proximity reduces uncertainty and minimizes the risks inherent 
in new and young businesses by sharing information with other investors, consultants, accountants 
and a wide range of other players. The nature of information-sharing tends to be personal and 
informal, built on mutual trust and, therefore, hard to obtain at long distance (Mason, 2007). This 
reliance on personal and professional contacts can be seen at every stage in the venture capital 
investment process: deal flow generation, deal evaluation and post-investment relationships 
(Mason, 2007). 
Therefore, as intermediaries between the institutional investors14F15 (e.g. pension funds), start-ups 
and large multinationals15F16 as potential buyers, traditional venture capital entities have concentrated 
in “global cities” (Sassen, 2010) that are directly connected to global financial channels.  
Conversely, the financial channel bringing together investors’ capital and innovative start-ups via 
crowdinvesting may be considered as spatially dispersed. Simultaneously locally-based through its 
founders and web-based, the platform brings together a large community of heterogeneous private 
and professional investors, geographically dispersed and with varied financial resources, with a 
large number of young enterprises from all kinds of industrial sectors spread throughout the 
national territory. Given that crowdinvesting platforms have only been in existence for two or three 
years, it would be too soon to draw any conclusions about exit routes, that is to say, the financial 
channel downstream. It may nevertheless be imagined that divestment will take place in the same 
way as for venture capital, principally through trade sale to large business or multinationals.  
15 The most important investors in venture capital: pension funds, investment and commercial banks, 
insurance companies (Metrick A. & Yasuda A., 2011). 
16 For European venture capital,  trade sale is the dominant divestment strategy (46.7% compared with 
14.8% IPO),  EVCA Yearbook 2012 (http://www.seca.ch/getattachment/6e3e6728-ccb7-4c56-9058-
22de93d27144/EVCA-Yearbook-2012.aspx) 
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Figure 4. Venture Capital Vs. Crowdinvesting platform spatial characteristics 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: THE SWISS CASE 
 
 5.1 Post-crisis investment choices of Swiss pension funds: financial 
and reputational risk aversion  
Our survey shows that there are several possible reasons why pension funds are currently so 
reluctant to invest in unlisted early stage businesses. First, there is a lack of highly skilled private 
equity and venture capital managers within Switzerland, and, second, the existing regulatory policy 
framework which issues recommendations and directions seems to discourage pension fund 
managers. This framework, which includes the Swiss federal authorities, politicians, the media, etc. 
can also put pressure on fund managers and engage their personal responsibility in case of 
financial losses. Unlike in the United States, where private equity and venture capital are regarded 
as ‘normal’, in Switzerland these investment vehicles are not widely known and, consequently, are 
not socially accepted because of their poor reputation. Hence, a heavy loss in equities will be 
passed by without comment in the media because it is ‘socially and politically accepted’, whereas 
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fluctuations in alternative investments are closely monitored by politicians and media alike, with 
strong criticism in the event of failure, affecting the reputation of the management.  
Moreover, unlike equity investments through financial markets where it is possible to simply follow 
the benchmark index, direct investment in start-ups requires a different management style with 
continuous monitoring, which consumes excessive time and resources and  hence cannot be 
justified from the fund’s point of view. Finally, the lack of enthusiasm for investing in unlisted small 
companies could be explained by the lack of entrepreneurial drive at pension fund management 
level. It appears from our interviews that pension fund heads are not entrepreneurs. They are often 
either former accountants who have gradually climbed the corporate ladder or portfolio managers 
coming from banks or other financial institutions. Their job consists of assessing the financial value 
of various products which is given by financial market evaluations. To invest in a more direct way in 
the economy, and more specifically in small unlisted firms, demands substantial experience in 
industry management.  
As a result, pension funds currently have no option but to continue to place their capital in the 
financial markets through intermediaries or directly in real estate (Theurillat et al., 2010). Although 
Swiss pension funds have traditionally purchased and owned buildings directly, the proportion of 
real estate in pension fund portfolios is constantly increasing: 20.7% in 2011, as compared with 
17.1% in 2007 (Swisscanto, 2012). Real estate assets, in fact, are viewed as a source of protection 
against the volatility of financial markets, despite rising prices, particularly in internationally 
significant cities such as Geneva, Lausanne and Zurich (Theurillat et al., 2010).  
While opting for massive investments in liquid financial assets, such as equities and bonds, these 
institutional investors increasingly tend to skew their portfolios in favour of large groups such as 
Nestlé, Novartis, Roche and UBS, while ensuring that they have exactly the same companies in 
their portfolio as other pension funds. We argue that this “flagship strategy” may be explained by 
the institutional and conventional management framework. It means that since the Global financial 
crisis of 2008, and as far back as 2001, the main strategy is no longer to make the largest profits 
but to manage risks. 
The question of risk is thus crucial to understanding the rationale and behaviour of investors. The 
financial system has eliminated the notion of uncertainty and replaced it with a concept of risk that 
is probabilisable (Savage, 1972) and controllable thanks to the principle of diversification 
established in portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1959). Conversely, investing directly in business projects 
means accepting radical uncertainty, an entrepreneurial gamble (Knight, 1921) which can only be 
partially controlled and which demands a high cost commitment, in both social and financial terms, 
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on the part of the investor (Julien and St-Pierre, 2012). We can therefore observe that what we call 
traditional alternative investments such as private equity or venture capital are not seen by pension 
funds as credible ways of satisfying their security and return criteria. Furthermore, it appears from 
our survey that investing directly in innovative unlisted businesses might involve a change in the 
management framework, accompanied by new entrepreneurial capacities and new tools for 
assessing the value of small firms.  
This survey of Swiss pension funds and asset investment consultants has revealed that the 
traditional players in direct investment, the venture capital companies, have not succeeded in 
offering pension funds feasible solutions for managing uncertainty. The opposite is true; these 
institutional investors have tended to reduce to a minimum this type of alternative investment, 
which is regarded as too risky and likely to damage the reputation of the fund and its management.  
 
 5.2 Towards a new venture capital investment business model?  
 
In Switzerland, against the background of the decline of traditional venture capital and the inability 
of business angels to fill the early-stage funding gap, new trends in direct investment have begun 
to emerge. Interviews conducted with some business angels clubs in 16F17 in Suisse Romande 
revealed aspirations to move away from the traditional business model in order to come closer to 
the platform model, with the intention of reducing the risk factor and improving the likelihood of 
achieving a match between the expectations of investors and entrepreneurs.  
 
Increasingly, business angel clubs are facing difficulties, not least due to the geographical 
limitations imposed by their business model. The need for proximity between investors and the 
start-up financed17F18, along with the restriction of financing to start-ups in a given region18F19, 
significantly reduce the choice of investment projects. Aware of these limits, the business angels 
we interviewed in the course of this study would like to see their model evolve into a broader form 
of intermediation, which would make it possible to share databases of start-ups and investors 
among several business angel clubs in different regions of Switzerland. Contrasting territorial 
characteristics, for example the greater critical mass of start-ups and investors in the Zurich region 
than in Valais, could also lie behind the desire to combine resources. In the words of our 
17 BAS (Business Angels Suisse) and CVBS (Club Valaisan des Business Angels) 
18 Interview with BAS (Business Angels Suisse) 
19 BAS (Business Angels Suisse) and CVBS (Club Valaisan des Business Angels) 
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interviewees, they would like to move towards an intermediation platform model inspired by the 
Go-Beyond platform19F20. Created in 2010 in Zurich, this platform aims at improving the chances of 
matching private investors and start-up founders. The Go-Beyond platform provides its members 
with a wide range of services, such as learning seminars for inexperienced investors, group and 
split investments, start-up value benchmarking, etc. The learning and risk-sharing processes that 
take place within a community of investors helps to reduce the feeling of uncertainty and leads to a 
better understanding of the particular nature of the process of investing in early-stage start-ups. 
In the field of traditional venture capital, new forms of intermediation between investors and start-
ups are also beginning to appear. In the following section, we present a case study of a hybrid 
investment platform which combines the traditional practices of venture capital with new 
crowdinvesting platform approaches.  
 
6. THE CASE OF INVESTIERE: THE HYBRID INVESTMENT MODEL  
Investiere is an intermediation platform for direct investment in early-stage start-ups. Its particular 
feature is to merge in a single business model the analytical and procedural rigour of venture 
capital professionals with the principles of transparency and shared knowledge offered by today’s 
virtual crowdinvesting platforms. 
Established as a concept in 2009, with the first financing round in 2010, the Investiere20F21 platform 
claims to have evolved within only three years into the largest private investors’ network in 
Switzerland, and even into the most important online start-up investment community in Europe 
today, with CHF 40 million annual private investment potential21F22. Today, Investiere says that their 
platform assembles a community of over 4000 members including Swiss innovative start-ups, 
international industry experts, Swiss and international individual and professional investors, and 
different private / public and media partners. According to the platform founders, this hybrid 
business model was conceived “to go away from pure fund model and to go towards a platform 
20http://www.go-beyond.biz/ 
21https://www.investiere.ch/ 
22 Lucas Weber, "Investiere snapshot" at II Swiss New Finance Conference 2013 
(http://www.swissnewfinance.ch/swissnewfinance/index.html) 
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model that brings together different types of investors and allows a better industry 
diversification”22F23. The next section will compare the decision-making process and start-up 
valuation strategies of Investiere with those of traditional VC funds. 
 
 6.1 Decision-making process: Investiere vs. traditional venture 
capital 
 
As mentioned above, the venture capital investment decision process normally includes the steps 
of deal origination, screening, evaluation, structuring and post-investment activities (Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984). Investment in early-stage start-ups is synonymous with high risks, so the new 
intermediation model developed by Investiere primarily aims to support individual investors, who 
may or may not have experience, by providing innovative tools for deal sourcing, deal selection 
and evaluation, as well as start-up monitoring.  
 
 6.2 Sources of deal origination 
In principle, venture capital entities apply two methods of project selection: traditional (the passive 
collection of business proposals) and more proactive and innovative (Internet research, deal 
sourcing software, expert networks, social media, etc.) (Teten and Farmer, 2010). Despite the 
greater choice of deals available from a huge volume of proposals by combining these two 
methods, the deal origination process may encounter the problem of identifying those of high 
quality and with strong exit potential (Teten and Farmer, 2010). On crowdinvesting platforms, deal 
sourcing is mainly performed through entrepreneurs’ applications on the platform. On the 
Investiere platform, the deals originate from a dual source: first, through the entrepreneurs’ direct 
application on the platform, and, second, through the recommendations of Investiere community 
members. This dual approach provides access to the ecosystem for hundreds of start-ups and 
ensures that the best projects are not overlooked. 
23 Steffen Wagner (Co-founder of Investiere), Presentation at I Swiss New Finance conference 2012 
(http://www.swissnewfinance.ch/swissnewfinance/2012.html) 
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 6.2.1 Deal selection and evaluation: risk and responsibility 
After the initial, pre-selection phase, venture capital funds conduct in-depth due diligence and 
multi-criteria analysis of the young business, which determines their decision to invest (Zacharakis 
and Shepherd, 2007). This stage is of great importance, because the fund team must use all its 
tools and expertise to be able to commit to a gamble on the future despite the radical uncertainty 
that characterises any business activity (Knight, 1921) especially in the field of innovation (Julien 
and St-Pierre, 2012). Unlike venture capital funds, crowdinvesting platforms do not assume all the 
responsibility for selecting ‘sound’ projects. After pre-selection by the platform founders, it is for the 
community’s investors to take responsibility for their decision by conducting their own assessment 
of the start-up. Interestingly, the legitimacy of VC funds and crowdinvestment platforms is not built 
on the same basis. In fact, VC fundraising from potential limited partners (LP) is mostly determined 
not only by VC fund size, but, in particular, by the reputation and successful track record of the VC 
team (Gompers, 1996; 1999). These factors appear to influence perceived controllability by limited 
partners, enhancing the success of fundraising (Kollmann et al., 2011). On the other hand, private 
investors on crowdinvesting platforms do not always have the necessary experience or expertise to 
assess the legitimate value of a start-up. Hence they tend to turn to an evaluation method which is 
self-referential in nature and based on mimicry (Keynes, 1965; Orléan, 2011). In our discussion of 
the evaluation approach based on shared opinion, we will follow Orléan (2011). This author 
emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between two different understandings of economic 
value: substantive value and opinion value. Substantive economic value refers to a valuation 
model based on substantive knowledge which is characterized by stabilised, clarified content 
provided, for instance, by industry experts (Crevoisier, 2011). In contrast, the ‘opinion’ value 
reflects an assessment model which consists of following or imitating the choices of players who 
are recognised as legitimate by a large community (Orléan and Diaz-Bone, 2013). For instance, on 
the Investiere platform, individual, inexperienced investors are invited to trust the opinion of certain 
members of the investment community who are recognised as experienced and competent (‘top 
investors’). In this way, small individual investors abandon the notion of control and agree to 
gamble on the future value of their investment. However, the amounts invested by private investors 
are incomparably lower (between €100 and €10 000) than the several millions invested by venture 
capital funds on behalf of major institutional investors. 
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Table 2. Decision making process: Investiere platform vs. Venture capital fund 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The Investiere start-up evaluation model therefore differs from that of venture capital companies in 
terms of strategies, but also in terms of the time-scale. When a venture capital fund chooses a 
start-up, it must first conduct an assessment and then take the decision on whether to invest. In-
depth due diligence which addresses financial, market, product and entrepreneurial issues is used 
to assess its potential and to consider the risks of involvement in an innovative project. 
Entrepreneurial uncertainty is then controlled by a VC team through close monitoring and active 
involvement in start-up management (Mason and Stark, 2004). These post-investment activities 
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are essential but also very costly, which may explain the small number of simultaneous 
participations, as well as high management fees23F24.  
On the Investiere platform, the assessment of start-ups takes place differently, for two reasons. 
First, because the number of projects funded annually (about 10) is higher than the one to three 
projects normally selected by traditional venture capital companies, Investiere’s founders are 
unable to sit on the board of each start-up selected. Second, as an intermediary - a facilitator of 
deals - the platform does not assume the same responsibility for the success of the projects as 
venture capital funds do, since it is the community’s investors who carry all the responsibility for 
their investment decisions, based mainly on the information available through the platform. On the 
Investiere platform, the evaluation process consists of several stages and takes from three to six 
months. Once the entrepreneur has registered his start-up on the platform, it joins the Investiere 
ecosystem, where it will be subjected to the ‘social proof’ principle, that is to say, it will be 
evaluated continuously by different categories of players within the community. 
 
 6.3 The ‘Social proof’ concept 
As has been shown above, the start-up assessment process happens differently, depending on 
whether it is conducted by a traditional venture capital company or by a crowdinvesting platform. It 
seems appropriate to approach this difference in terms of the notion of time, which is an important 
factor in early-stage investment. It is necessary to be both proactive and fast to identify and seize a 
good opportunity before others do so. Otherwise, at a later stage the cost of access for investors 
who arrive last may be too high, or the funding round may already have been closed. At the same 
time, it is important to take the time required to assess a new project which is only at the first 
prototype stage.  
So as not to miss a project with high potential, and to be able to integrate it on the platform ahead 
of the others, the Investiere founders first conduct an accelerated pre-selection process and, once 
the investment offer has been officially announced, potential investors have the time necessary to 
24 2% of invested capital 
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take the decision to invest. The ‘social proof’ strategy plays an essential role here, at several 
levels. At the first of these levels, some fifty industrial experts (industry curators) who are members 
of the community conduct an initial selection:  
“In our case, we do involve industry experts right at the beginning, before we even look at a 
deal. We just simply look at what niche that specific start-up plays in. And we show this to 
industry experts. And these guys need very little information. They will look at the ecosystem, 
who you are connected to, what your product is about, who you sell it to. They know 
distribution sale channels, they know exit candidates. He can very quickly give us a thumbs 
up, a thumbs down, and if it is worth going ahead.” (Investiere founder) 
After filtering by the experts and the Investiere team’s due diligence, the observation phase begins. 
This is a matter of observing the attitude of the community in response to the new project 
announced on the platform. As the investors have the opportunity to show their interest in investing 
with an indication of the amount they are willing to invest, it is important to see who is interested in 
the project and what their intentions are. So the involvement or otherwise of FFF24F25 can in itself 
provide an initial indication to community members:  
“Well, if you look at what happens, you want to see that there are some friends and family 
commitments, because if there are no FFF commitments, something must be wrong. There 
must be someone from the person’s network that puts money in. So you wait, that’s fine to 
wait a little.” (Investiere founder)  
As well as the involvement of FFF, interest on the part of some top investors, business angels or 
serial entrepreneurs provides additional assurance as to the validity of the business plan and the 
potential of the project. 
The presence of a number of top investors among the community’s members is an essential 
feature of the Investiere business model. Who are these top investors? They are typically large and 
25 Friends, Family and Fools 
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successful financial players, such as large Swiss banks, large venture capital funds, major Swiss 
companies and also some of the most successful Swiss start-ups. When investing in young 
innovative ventures, the presence of these co-investors on the platform helps to enhance its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the community of private individual investors. These top investors have a 
leverage effect in attracting the best entrepreneurs to Investiere, as well as many private investors 
who would not otherwise have come. Private investors are often inexperienced, and lack any 
specific knowledge regarding the new product which they hope to finance. That is why the fact that 
they can co-invest alongside top investors gives them a degree of confidence and calms their 
anxieties in the face of uncertainty: 
“Here is an example of an investment that is currently active. It is interesting to see that the 
co-investors, the potential co-investors because it is not yet closed, in this case are the 
founders and CEO of the most successful Swiss IT start-ups that we ever had (Doodle, 
jobstart.ch, etc.) These kinds of guys have know-how in company exit and they think this 
company is worth investing in. And you may want to do the same. That’s how it works. This 
may be ZKB25F26 or whoever, but we believe in this social proof.” (Investiere founder) 
For its part, the Investiere team works to achieve the best possible match between the 
entrepreneur and the investors who will sit on the board of directors, ensuring that the investors 
who become involved in the management of the start-up have the appropriate expertise to monitor 
and support the young venture. 
  
26 Zürcher Kantonalbank (ZKB) 
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CONCLUSION 
In this article we have sought to examine the emerging forms of financial intermediation which 
have appeared over the past two or three years in the area of innovation funding in Switzerland.  
The hypothesis that new investment channels developed after the 2008 financial crisis led us to 
question the role of the venture capital industry in the increasing importance of short, direct 
investment channels which can replace investment through the financial markets. Contrary to this 
hypothesis, the venture capital industry has experienced a phase of decline over the last five 
years. We believe that this decline can be explained at two levels. Upstream, the reputational risks 
run by pension fund managers, and the Swiss political and institutional framework which does not 
encourage alternative investment, explain the difficulty venture capital companies have in raising 
new funds. Downstream, the trend for venture capitalists to abandon the early-stage sector to 
focus more on the very competitive market in high-quality, expanding SMEs derives from a certain 
failure of the traditional business model, mainly at the deal sourcing, start-up evaluation and 
investment decision phases. 
We are now also witnessing the growth of new investment channels from below, following the 
emergence of new forms of financial intermediation represented by crowdinvesting platforms. Via a 
case a study of the Swiss platform Investiere which combines professional investors, specialists in 
various sectors and inexperienced private investors who would like to invest directly in start-up 
projects, we have demonstrated some of the advantages of this new model by comparison with the 
traditional venture capital model. First, based on the principle of collaboration, the platform model 
benefits from its capacity to mobilise cutting-edge industrial and financial expertise appropriate to 
each particular start-up. Second, it draws advantages from exploiting the potential of new Internet 
technologies to bring together and increase the interaction between different players within a large 
community of investors and promoters of innovative projects. Finally, we believe that the 
crowdinvesting platform model provides a new answer to the fundamental question of managing 
entrepreneurial uncertainty. Venture capital funds have traditionally based their management of 
uncertainty on the specialist expertise of a small team of managers capable of conducting in-depth 
due diligence, close monitoring and active participation in the management of a financed start-up. 
On the Investiere platform, the feeling of uncertainty inherent in the early-stage start-up market is 
managed via the innovative concept of ‘social proof’. While accepting that radical uncertainty can 
never be completely managed, we suggest in this article that the new business model adopted by 
the Investiere platform is more in keeping with today’s socio-economic circumstances, and 
presents a more convincing and effective way of managing uncertainty than the traditional venture 
capital model. 
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The results of this research have led us to reflect on the future and the role of crowdinvesting 
platforms in the development of new investment channels in Switzerland. First, will the emblematic 
case of the Investiere platform in Switzerland be extended on a larger scale, marking a new 
direction for the venture capital industry? In other words, are we moving towards a new more 
decentralised system of financial intermediation, based on horizontal relationships between a 
range of stakeholders? The second question which arises concerns the ability of these new multi-
sided intermediation platforms to generate a sufficiently large membership to ensure their long-
term survival. As for institutional investors, hitherto reluctant to entrust their wealth to venture 
capital funds, will they be more inclined to invest in start-ups via crowdinvesting platforms, sharing 
the risks with different private and professional investors? Finally, at the current time, it is still too 
early to gauge the impact of these new forms of financing on the economy in different regions. This 
question remains unanswered and could be the subject of future research.   
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